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CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE REFORM:
THE AGENDA BEFORE CONGRESS*
GEORGE FISHMAN**

Civil asset forfeiture relies on a curious legal fiction-that property
itself may be guilty of misdeeds, of crimes, and may therefore be
punished. Though this may seem odd, it is more than a relic of our
pagan, animistic past. Think back to Exodus: "If an ox gore a man or a
woman, that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh
shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be quit."' I can picture
the headline: Drug Enforcement Administration Agents Seize Ox as

Conveyance in Drug Scheme and Send it Undercover as a Drug Mule.
So, we have animals as moral agents. Speaking of objects imbued
with free will, we come to English imperial admiralty law, the wellspring
of modem civil forfeiture.' As Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, "[a] ship
is the most living of inanimate things. ... [E]very one gives a gender to
vessels ....
It is only by supposing the ship to have been treated as if
endowed with personality, that the arbitrary seeming peculiarities of the
maritime law can be made intelligible ... ."' Holmes used this example:
* This speech incorporates U.S. Rep. Henry J. Hyde's testimony before the
Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary.
The February 1994 hearing covered a number of forfeiture issues and focused on H.R.
3315, which included civil asset forfeiture reform provisions introduced by U.S. Rep.
Craig Washington.
** Assistant Counsel, House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Immigration
& Claims.
1. Exodus 21:28 (King James).
2. For a discussion of an intermediate step, the English doctrine of deodand, see
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-82 (1974) and ParkerHarris Co. v. Tate, 188 S.W. 54, 55-56 (Tenn. 1916). Under this doctrine, an object
that caused the death of another person-the deodand-was forfeited to the King for sale
in the belief that the King would provide money for Masses to be said for the good of
the dead man's soul, or ensure that the money was put to charitable uses. CaleroToledo, 416 U.S. at 681. When application of the deodand to religious or eleemosynary
purposes ceased, and the deodand became a source of revenue for the Crown, the
institution was justified as a penalty for carelessness. Id. Deodands never became part
of the common law in the United States. Id.; see also Parker-HarrisCo., 188 S.W. at
55 ("mo the credit of American jurisprudence, from the outset the doctrine was deemed
so repugnant to our ideas of justice as not to be included as a part of the common law

of this country.").
3. OLiVER W. HoLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 7 (Little, Brown & Co. 1923)
(1881).
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A collision takes place between two vessels, the Ticonderoga and
the Melampus, through the fault of the Ticonderoga alone. That
ship is under a lease at the time, the lessee has his own master in
charge, and the owner of the vessel has no manner of control
over it. The owner, therefore, is not to blame, and he cannot
even be charged on the ground that the damage was done by his
servants. He is free from personal liability on elementary
principles. Yet it is perfectly settled that there is a lien on his
vessel for the amount of the damage done, and this means that the
vessel may be arrested and sold to pay the loss in any admiralty
court whose process will reach her. If a livery-stable keeper lets
a horse and wagon to a customer, who runs a man down by
careless driving, no one would think of claiming a right to seize
the horse and the wagon.4
Holmes sees the rationale here:
The ship is the only security available in dealing with foreigners,
and rather than send one's own citizens to search for a remedy
abroad in strange courts, it is easy to seize the vessel and satisfy
the claim at home, leaving the foreign owners to get their
indemnity as they may be able.'
There, we have it. In a British plot to dominate world trade lies the
origin of civil forfeiture.
By 1789, ships and cargo violating customs laws were subject to
federal forfeiture. 6 Why did we Americans so enthusiastically adopt
English admiralty law? After all, we were very sensitive to English
barbarisms, especially forfeiture. For instance, British law provided for7
the seizure of felons' estates; Congress forbade this practice in 1790.
Well, the reason was simple: money. In the early years of our republic,
4. Id. at 27 (footnote omitted).
5. Id. at 28.
6. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 12, 36, 1 Stat. 39, 47. Section 12 provides that,
subject to enumerated exceptions, a master or commander of a ship must not unload
goods unless in open day, and must obtain a permit. Penalties for noncompliance with
time and permit requirements include forfeiture of all goods landed or discharged.
Section 36 sets forth the procedures for litigating a claim for recovery of goods forfeited.
7. See United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 959 n.23 (5th Cir.) ("The first
Congress... enacted a provision barring corruption of the blood or forfeiture of [an]
estate upon conviction.") (citing Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 117), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 943 (1982).
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customs duties constituted more than eighty percent of federal revenues!
Even though customs is now just a handmaiden to protectionism and
not a major revenue generator, civil forfeiture has not only survived, it
has prospered. Why? The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 19709 provided for the forfeiture of controlled substances

and raw materials, containers, and conveyances thereof. 1°
The
Psychotropic Substances Act of 197811 added forfeiture of money and
other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for
a controlled substance, and all proceeds traceable to such an exchange.' 2

8. See Tamara A. Piety, Comment, Scorched Earth:How the Expansion of Civil
Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 911, 940
n.137 (1991) (citing BUREAU OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF CO MmCE, HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNrED STATEs, H.R. Doc. No. 33, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 712
(1960)).
9. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801971 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) (strengthening existing law enforcement authority in regard
to illegal drug transactions).
10. Id. § 511(a)(1)-(4), 84 Stat. at 1276 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1)-(4)
(1988)). The statute provides:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed,
dispensed, or acquired in violation of this subehapter.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are
used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing,
delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled substance in violation
of this subehapter.
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for
property described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9).
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are
used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate
the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property
described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9) ....
11. Pub. L. No. 95-633, 92 Stat. 3768 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988))
("Mo amend the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 and
other laws to meet obligations under the Convention on Psychotropic Substances relating
to regulatory controls on the manufacture, distribution, importation and exportation of
psychotropic substances, and for other purposes.").
12. Id. § 301(a)(1), 92 Stat. at 3777 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988))
(amending 21 U.S.C. § 881 to include the government's power to seek the forfeiture of
monies furnished in exchange for a controlled substance). Section 881(a)(6) provides:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of
value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for
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The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984' 3 added all real property
used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the commission of
a drug crime. 4 The increasing utilization of these statutes caused the
amount deposited in the Department of Justice's Assets Forfeiture Fund
to increase from $27 million in fiscal year 1985, to $555.7 million in
1993.11 And the money is used for law-enforcement purposes.16
So far, so good. As former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh
said: "[l]t is truly satisfying to think that it is now possible for a drug
dealer to serve time in a forfeiture-financed prison, after being arrested by
agents driving a forfeiture-provided automobile, while working in a
forfeiture-funded sting operation." 17 However, a few years ago, those
reading advance sheets began noticing a nascent trend: federal judges
a controlled substance in violation of this subehapter, all proceeds
traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments,
and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this
subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act
or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted
without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
Id.
13. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (1988)).
14. See id. § 306(a), 98 Stat. at 2050 (amended by Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5105,
102 Stat. 4301 (1988)) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988)). The
statute provides:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including
any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any
appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used,
in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a
violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's
imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act
or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted
without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
Id.
15. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR AssET FORFEITURE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ANNUAL REPORT OF JUSTICE ASSET FORFEITURE PROGRAM: FISCAL YEAR 1993, at 16
(1994).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1) (Supp. V 1993) (establishing the Department of Justice
Assets Forfeiture Fund, money from which is available to the Attorney General for law
enforcement purposes).
17. Richard Thornburgh, Address Before the Cleveland City Club Forum Luncheon
(May 11, 1990).
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inveighing against the utter lack of due process in civil forfeiture
proceedings."8 And those keeping up with investigative journalism
noticed a slew of newspaper and television exposes of innocent property
owners being stripped of their belongings, and on one occasion, of life
itself, by overzealous law enforcement officials in hot pursuit of funds for
their departments.19 These are what first attracted the interest of
Congressman Henry J. Hyde. You see, proud members of congress often
circulate reprints of noteworthy articles from their hometown papers. A
representative from Pittsburgh did this with a forfeiture series in the old
Pittsburgh Press' and Congressman Hyde was astounded by what he
read. This was happening in America?
18. See, e.g., United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d
896, 905 (2d Cir. 1992). The government alleged that Statewide had violated a federal
money-laundering statute, and seized Statewide's assets without a prior hearing or prompt
post-seizure hearing. Id. at 901. Statewide contended that such a seizure and the
subsequent shutdown of its business without proper hearings violated due process. Id.
at 905. The court, applying a balancing test between the government's interests and
Statewide's interest, held that an illegal search did not immunize the property from
forfeiture, but would preclude the government from introducing any illegally obtained
evidence. Id. The court admonished district courts that, "in order to preserve some
modicum of due process," approving seizures c parte should be done only upon a
showing of "the most extraordinary. . . circumstances" and, whenever possible, the
courts should use less drastic measures "until the criminality underlying the claimed
forfeiture can be established in the context of a proper criminal proceeding with its
attendant constitutional protections to the accused." Id. The court further stated: "We
continue to be enormously troubled by the government's increasing and virtually
unchecked use of the civil forfeiture statutes and the disregard for due process that is
buried in those statutes." Id.; see also United States v. $12,390, 956 F.2d 801, 807 (8th
Cir. 1992) (Beam, J., dissenting in part) ("I would hold that a statute that permits an
owner of noncontraband property to be divested of title on a mere showing of probable
cause for the institution of a forfeiture suit does not provide the minimum process due.").
19. See, e.g., Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Tainted Cash or Easy Money?, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, June 14, 1992; Andrew Schneider & Mary P. Flaherty, PresumedGuilty: The
Law's Victims in the War on Drugs, Prrr. PREss, Aug. 11-16, 1991 (multi-part
investigative series); Tim Poor & Louis J. Rose, Hooked on the Drug War, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 28-May 5, 1991; Oct. 6-11, 20, 1991 (multi-part investigative
series); Deborah Yetter, Police Work orPiracy?,CouRIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Oct. 6-7,
1991; see also 20/20: Killing in Paradise (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 2, 1993);
Street Stories (CBS television broadcast, July 9, 1992); 60 Minutes (CBS television
broadcast, Apr. 5, 1992).
20. See Schneider & Flaherty, supra note 19.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 39

The critical mass for reform was attained when sympathetic editorials
and op-ed columns began appearing in the Chicago Tribune."1
Congressman Hyde knew that libertarian property rights advocates, as well
as those concerned with the impact of forfeiture on minorities, were
natural allies. But the support of the respected Chicago paper assured
him that, if he took the lead on reform, he was somewhat safe from kneejerk accusations of being soft on the war on drugs. I believe this is the
key to eventual legislative success for forfeiture reform on the federal
level. Congressman Hyde gives cover to other Republicans worried about
going out on a limb, and with criticism not just coming from the left
wing, the Justice and Treasury departments know that the times are achangin' and that it might just be in their best interests to have a hand in
the fashioning of reform. I think this had something to do with Attorney
General Janet Reno's October 1993 signal to Jack Brooks, former
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, to hold off on hearings until
the Department of Justice could review its asset forfeiture program.2'
There is a question of motives which I think should be addressed.
Nancy Hollander, President of the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, has stated that Congress (including, presumably,
Congressman Hyde) has awakened to forfeiture abuses because "abuses
have stretched into areas of society not previously touched .... [Those]
people who have a voice, people who can tell Congress."'
This is
partially true. Congressman Hyde believes that white men have rights
too, but it is not the principal reason that he has come to advocate
forfeiture reform. Congressman Hyde is struck by the fact that so many
minorities are being victimized by forfeiture abuses-stopped for matching
drug courier profiles of the most stereotypical kind and having whatever
cash they have on them seized.' Now these profiles may serve a valid
21. See, e.g., Stephen Chapman, Seizing Properly:Law Enforcement's Dangerous
Weapon, Cm. TRiB., Mar. 7, 1993, at 3; What Other Newspapers Are Saying, Cm.
TRiB., Feb. 27, 1993, at 21.
22. See, e.g., AMERIcAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DRAFT MODEL-CIVIL
FORFEITURE BILL (1992); BRENDA GRANTLAND, FORFEITURE ENDANoERS AmRICAN
RIGHTS, FEDERAL FORFEITURE LAWS NEED TO BE AMENDED TO RESTORE DuE PROCESS
AND PROTECT THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF INNOCENT PEOPLE: F.E.A.R.'s PROPOSAL FOR
REFoRM 2, 3 (1992); TERRANCE G. REED (CATO INSTITUTE), AMERICAN FORFEITURE
LAW: PROPERTY OWNERS MEET THE PROSECUTOR 18 (1992) (Policy Analysis No. 179);
NATIONAL ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWS., ASSET FORFErTURE POsIION
STATEMENT 5 (1994).

23. See Letter from Janet Reno to Jack Brooks (Oct. 18, 1993) (on file with the New
York Law SchoolLaw Review).
24. Henry J. Reske, A Law Run Wild, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 24.
25. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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function-to help in structuring initial searches-or they may not, I but
they certainly shouldn't be the sole basis for the confiscation of property.
You have all heard about the martyrs of the forfeiture reform movement:
black landscaper Willie Jones, who lost $9600 in cash intended for
shrubbery purchases because he bought a short-retum airline ticket for
cash at the Nashville airport,' and Selena Washington, who lost $19,000
when she ventured into darkest Volusia County, Florida, with large
amounts of cash to buy building material for her Charleston home, which
was damaged by Hurricane Hugo.'
Congressman Hyde sees this as a devastatingly destructive state of
affairs. How can we continue to urge the dispossessed, the underclass,
those alienated from society, to become entrepreneurs, to buy into the
American Dream, to strive to climb the ladder, if their property, so
painfully acquired, can be taken away so cavalierly? Jack Kemp tells us
that:
[Our goals in America's inner cities should be] empowerment,
ownership, and entrepreneurship ....
[We should] empower individuals to take control of their lives by
acquiring education, jobs, homes, private property-and by
gaining access to investment capital for entrepreneurial ventures.
Generations of Americans built this country by working,
saving, owning a home, starting a business. This is the classic
American formula for escaping poverty.'
Do we really want to convince the poor that social striving is useless
because the rewards are apt to be confiscated based upon little pretext?
Indeed, some might call this a need to prop up our most quintessentially
American of myths. Congressman Hyde, however, sees it as preventing
26. See Paul Finkelman, The Second Casually of War: Civil Liberties and the War
on Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389, 1416-30 (1993).
27. See Andrew Schneider & Mary P. Flaherty, Government Seizures Vtctimize
Innocent, PITT. PRESS, Aug. 11, 1991, at Al. A federal judge eventually ordered this
money returned. See Jones v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 819 F. Supp. 698, 71921 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
28. See Brazil & Berry, supranote 19, at A-16. For a detailed analysis of Selena
Washington's case and the forfeiture practices of the Volusia County Sheriff's Office, see
Carol M. Bast, The Plightof the Minority Motorist, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 49 (1994).
29. U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., Secretary Jack Kemp Addresses the
National Conference of Black Mayors, Remarks at Kansas City, Missouri, Apr. 23,
1992, at 1, 3, 4 (1992).
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true inequities from reinforcing distorted and destructive assumptions
about American society. As social critic George Gilder writes:
Blacks are told that the world is against them; that the prevailing
powers want to keep them down; that racism and discrimination
are ubiquitous except under the order and surveillance of the law;
that jobs are unavailable in business; that slumlords gouge their
tenants; that policemen are to be assumed guilty until proven
innocent of bias and brutality; that Martin Luther King and the
Kennedy brothers were killed by the white establishment ....
[f]n the United States what this image of a racist and venal
country achieves . . . is to incapacitate all of the poor who
believe in it. Upward mobility is at least partly dependent on
upward admiration: on an accurate perception of the nature of the
contest and a respect for the previous winners of it. If we tell the
poor that the system is corrupt, racist ... we give them a false
and crippling view of society.'
Now, lest I give the wrong impression, I should point out that
Congressman Hyde is not concerned with protecting drug users and
traffickers who happen to come from poor communities. Unlike some
commentators, 3 he sees no problem in throwing people out of public
housing projects for drug use (provided, of course, that appropriate due
process standards are met).
Well, to the bill. Congressman Hyde introduced House Bill 2417, the
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 1993, on June 15, 1993,2 with the
qualified support of the American Civil Liberties Union'3 and the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.' What does it do?
The first reform was easy. It was one every commentator and interest
30. GEORoE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 99 (1981).
31. See Jack Yoskowitz, The War on the Poor: Civil Forfeiture of Public Housing,
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 567, 592-98, 600 (1992) (suggesting that, due to the
"fundamentally different" nature of public housing residents, it is questionable whether

civil forfeiture laws should be applied when eviction of such residents may result in
homelessness, and arguing that forfeiture's policy objectives are not furthered by such
seizures because public housing cannot be sold for revenue, and there is a potential of
evicting "innocent" family members along with the drug user).
32. H.R. 2417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Senator James Jeffords of Vermont
introduced the bill in the Senate. S. 1655, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
33. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 22.
34. See NATIONAL ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, supra note 22, at 6.
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group was clamoring for: switch the burden of proofi35 Currently, it is
the property owner, not the government, who is assigned the burden of
proof when he or she sues to try to get property back. 6 All the
government is required to do is make an initial showing of probable cause
that the property is "guilty"; the property owner must then establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the property is "innocent" or otherwise
not subject to forfeiture.37 Because this standard of proof is lower than
that used in criminal law, it requires no antecedent criminal conviction of
the property owner. Even the acquittal of the owner does not bar
forfeiture of the property. 8 It has been estimated that eighty percent of
those who lose property to the government through civil forfeitures are
never charged with any crime. 9 Under H.R. 2417, the government
would have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the property
is subject to forfeiture-that the unlawful act on which the forfeiture is
based actually occurred, and that there is a sufficient nexus between the
35. See, e.g., Marc B. Stahl, Asset Forfeiture, Burdens of Proofand the War on
Drugs, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRnnNOLOGY 274, 292-93 (1992) (arguing that, due to the
substantial interests of claimants in civil forfeiture actions, there is no distinction between
such actions and criminal cases, therefore, the government should have to prove its case
for civil forfeiture beyond a reasonable doubt); Michael Schechter, Note, Fear and
Loathing and the Forfeiture Laws, 75 CoRNmLL L. REv. 1151, 1182 (1990) ("If
Congress were to re-enact the statute [21 U.S.C. § 881(h)], it should require the
government to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt when a
claimant challenges the forfeiture."); see also AMERICAN CIvIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra
note 22; GRANTLAND, supra note 22, at 2; NATIONAL ASS'N OF CRIMNAL DEFENSE
LAWS., supra note 22; REEM, supranote 22, at 18; Letter from David Smith to Kathleen
Clark, Senate Judiciary Committee, at 6 (Aug. 19, 1992) (on file with the New York Law
School Law Review).
36. See, e.g., Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 615, 46 Stat. 590, 757 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988)) (providing that the government bears the initial
burden of showing probable cause to seize property based upon a customs law violation,
and upon such showing, the burden of proving an absence of culpability rests upon the
owner of the property seized).
37. See id.
38. See United States v. Assortmentof 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984) (involving
an in rem action brought by United States against weapons seized at the defendant's after
a jury found him not guilty of dealing in firearms without a license). The Court
observed: "It is clear that the difference in the relative burdens of proof in the criminal
and civil actions precludes the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel," id. at
362, and ruled that "neither collateral estoppel nor double jeopardy bars a civil, remedial
forfeiture proceeding initiated following an acquittal on related criminal charges." Id. at
361.
39. See Schneider & Flaherty, supra note 27, at Al, A8.
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The property owner would still have the

burden of proving affirmative defenses such as lack of knowledge of the
illegal activity. 4'

This is the sine qua non of reform. Probable cause as a standard?

Probable cause can be met by rank hearsay.4'

The Department of Justice

even has argued that probable cause can be met on the basis of anonymous
informants' tips.

Forfeiture expert David Smith notes that "[tihe

government's probable cause showing serves a preliminary screening
function analogous to a grand jury indictment and is no more strict 'proof'

of the property's guilt than an indictment is proof of a criminal
defendant's guilt."' It is just unseemly to rely on such a standard when
depriving people of their property.
There are several alternatives to consider when addressing this

dilemma: giving the government the burden of proof by a preponderance
of the evidence, by clear and convincing evidence, or by proof beyond a

reasonable doubt. Why did Congressman Hyde not pick proof beyond a
reasonable doubt? Well, if you can prove that, why not just throw the
45
guy in jail and then seize his property through criminal forfeiture?
Freedom is the most precious of our rights, and it sometimes may be

impossible to build a criminal case against a sophisticated and wellinsulated drug lord that is strong enough to justify incarceration. That
doesn't mean it is immoral to confiscate property based on a lower
quantum of proof. As the Supreme Court has said:

40. H.R. 2417 § 4 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1608).
41. Id. § 8.
42. See United States v. 900 Rio Vista Boulevard, 803 F.2d 625, 629 nn.28-29
(11th Cir. 1986) (stating that testimony of a DEA agent linking appellant's property with
drug trafficking activities, although hearsay, may be used to establish probable cause).
43. GRANTLAND, supranote 22, at 8.
44. DAvID B. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FoRF'rrmUn CASES 11.01,
at 11-10.1 (1994).
45. See id.
13.01-14.09; see also 21 U.S.C. § 853(d) (1988). This statute
establishes a "rebuttable presumption" that any property of a person convicted of a Title
21 drug felony is subject to forfeiture if the government establishes by a preponderance
of the evidence that (1) such property was acquired by such person during the period of
the violation or "within a reasonable time" after such period; and (2) there was "no
likely source for such property" other than the violation. See SMITH, supra note 44,
14.03, at 14-29. In addition, criminal forfeiture of property following a conviction of
the property owner under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
requires a finding by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the property in question is
so related to the RICO offense that it is subject to forfeiture under the statute. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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"The rule of evidence requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt

is generally applicable only in strictly criminal proceedings. It is
founded upon the reason that a greater degree of probability

should be required as a ground of judgment in criminal cases,
which affect life or liberty .... "I
Justice Brennan uses the term "interest of transcending value." 47
Why not choose preponderance of the evidence as the standard?
Well, maybe. At least it takes the crucial step-symbolically and
practically of shifting the burden of proof to the government, and those
few federal civil forfeiture statutes that do put a burden of proof on the
government use this standard. However, it's awfully weak in such a
punitive environment as property forfeiture and, besides, Congressman
Hyde needs a bargaining chip. So, the standard chosen was clear and
convincing evidence.49 By the way, this is the standard used by the State
46. United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 49 (1914) (quoting Roberge v. Burnham,
124 Mass. 277 (1878)).
47. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,525 (1958). In Speiser, the plaintiffs refused
to swear by oath that they did not advocate the violent overthrow of the federal or
California governments, and did not support a foreign government against the United
States, which was a condition to receiving a veteran's property-tax exemption, and were
denied the exemption on that basis. Id. at 515-17. The plaintiffs contended that the
oath, as a condition to the exemption, was forbidden by the federal Constitution because
the exemption denied them freedom of speech without due process. See id. In reversing
in favor of the plaintiffs, the Court declared: "Where one party has at stake an interest
of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this ... margin of error [in
factflnding] is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden
of producing a sufficiency of proof in the first instance, and of persuading the factflnder
... of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 525-26.
48. Civil forfeiture does serve certain remedial (as opposed to punitive) goals, such
as depriving "criminals of the tools by which they conduct their illegal activities."
United States v. 526 Liscum Drive, 866 F.2d 213, 217 (6th Cir. 1989) (articulating the
remedial intent of the forfeiture provision of the Controlled Substances Act in a case in
which the appellant sought to establish sufficient ownership in order to challenge
forfeiture of property connected with drug trafficking activity). Another such goal is
"reimburs[mg] the Government for investigation and enforcement expenses." One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409. U.S. 232, 237 (1972) (per curiam) (stating
"that such purposes characterize remedial rather than punitive sanctions"). However,
there comes a point where civil penalties are so overwhelmingly punitive in nature that
a criminal law burden of proof must constitutionally be assigned to the government.
Courts have not found that level to be reached by our civil forfeiture statutes, but instead
have found that such measures are not "so unreasonable or excessive that [they]
transformi] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty." Id. at
237. For an overview of this issue, see Stahl, supra note 35, at 291-337.
49. H.R. 2417 § 4.
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of New York in its drug forfeiture law, 50 and it is the standard that the
was mandated by the Florida
Supreme Court of Florida ruled
51
Constitution's Due Process Clause.
Second, H.R. 2417 also provides for the appointment of counsel for
indigents.52 There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in civil
forfeiture cases.53 I dare say this is one of the reasons why eighty

percent of forfeitures are not challenged, "' along with the onerous burden
of proof,55 the low value of much forfeited property relative to the cost

of counsel, ' the intimidating nature of the legal system to many low-

income property owners and, yes, the threat of self-incrimination to those
property owners rightly facing criminal prosecution. 57

Forfeiture

50. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. § 1311(3) (McKinney Supp. 1994) (providing that,
generally, in a forfeiture action commenced against a criminal defendant, the government
must prove its claim by a preponderance of the evidence. In a forfeiture action
commenced against a non-criminal defendant, however, the government must show by
clear and convincing evidence the commission of the crime and, then, in an action
relating to the proceeds of a crime, substituted proceeds of a crime, or instrumentality
of a crime, the government need only prove its claim by a preponderance of the
evidence.).
51. See Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957, 967
(Fla. 1991). The court held:
In forfeiture proceedings the state impinges on basic constitutional rights of
individuals who may never have been formally charged with any civil or
criminal wrongdoing. This Court has consistently held that the [Florida]
constitution requires substantial burdens of proof where state action may
deprive individuals of basic rights.
Id.
52. H.R. 2417 §§ 5, 7 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1608 and 28 U.S.C. § 524(c),
respectively).
53. See, e.g., Resek v. State, 706 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1985) (rejecting counsel's
argument in in rein forfeiture proceeding that counsel should be appointed for the
indigent defendant). The court observed: "A claimant in a forfeiture action does not face
loss of liberty as a direct result of the forfeiture action." Id. at 291.
54. See Smith, supra note 35, at 5.
55. See 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988).
56. See, e.g., Andrew Schneider & Mary P. Flaherty, Forfeiture Threatens
Constitutional Rights, PrIT. PRESs, Aug. 16, 1991, at Al. Police seized $2300
belonging to a vehicle owner in whose car they claimed to have found cocaine. Id. at
A8. Although the substance was shown in lab tests to be bubble gum, the owner of the
car had to fight in court for almost a year to reclaim his cash. Id.
57. See, e.g., Jay N. Rosenberg, Note, ConstitutionalRights and Civil Forfeiture
Actions, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 390 (1988):
One area of uncertainty regarding the scope of constitutional protections
afforded forfeiture claimants is the degree to which a forfeiture claimant's fifth
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proceedings are so punitive-quasi-criminal if you will-that there should
be a right to counsel. H.R. 2417 would provide representation of counsel
for whomever is unable to afford a lawyer to challenge a federal civil
forfeiture." The means for such representation would come from the
Justice Department's Assets Forfeiture Fund.

Third, H.R. 2417 provides added protection for innocent property
owners.o Currently, real property used to commit or to facilitate a
federal drug crime is forfeitable unless the violation was "committed or
omitted without the knowledge or consent of [the] owner."' This is, of

course, meant to protect innocent owners. However, a number of federal
courts have seriously eroded the provision's protections by ruling that the
owner must have had no knowledge of and provided no consent to the
prohibited use of the property.61 Such an interpretation would mean that
property owners such as Jesse Bunch would be out of luck.62 Mr. Bunch

owned a bar and residential apartments in a highly active drug trafficking
area.'

Although he knew of the drug-selling activity on the premises,

amendment right against self-incrimination may be permissibly compromised
in situations where he bears the burden of proof in the civil case but also faces
the possibility of a parallel criminal prosecution. This situation makes the
claimant choose between vigorously defending the forfeiture case and risking
self-incrimination, or cautiously contesting the forfeiture action so as to
preserve the fifth amendment privilege.
Id. at 393-94 (footnote omitted).
58. H.R. 2417 § 5 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1608). Maximum compensation would
not exceed $3500 per attorney for representation before a U.S. District Court and $2500
per attorney for representation before an appellate court (the equivalent to the maximums
for appointed counsel in federal felony cases). See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2) (1988).
These figures could be waived in cases of "extended or complex" representation where
"excess payment is necessary to provide fair compensation and the payment is approved
by the chief judge of the circuit." See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(3).
59. H.R. 2417 § 8 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) by replacing "without the
knowledge or consent of that owner," and inserting "either without the knowledge of that
owner or without the consent of that owner").
60. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam) (holding that the "innocent owner" defense is unavailable when "the claimant
eitherknew or consented to the illegal activities" becausethe policy behind forfeiture (to
seize all property that has a substantial connection to the illegal drug activity) would be
seriously undercut if an owner, aware of the illegal activities, could be deemed
"innocent" because the owner had not consented to such activity).
62. See United States v. 710 Main St., 744 F. Supp. 510, aff'd on reh'g, 753 F.
Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
63. Id. at 512.
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he took many steps to prevent it.' He fired two bartenders after they
were arrested at the bar for drug violations, evicted two residents
following their arrests, restricted use of the restrooms, posted signs
advising patrons that they were subject to being photographed and
searched, restricted the bar's hours of operation, and periodically called
police to report drug activity in the vicinity of his property.' However,
drug activity continued and the government seized the property.'
Luckily for Mr. Bunch, a court ruled that he was protected by the
innocent owner defense because of his lack of consent to the illegal drug
trafficking and his reasonable efforts to put it to an end. 67 The court
found that "Mr. Bunch, who was trying to eke out an income from a
business located in a drug-infested area that posed great risks to the safety
of him and his family... fulfilled his legal obligation."' This is only
fair, and should be the proper interpretation of the innocent owner
defense. H.R. 2417 would clarify that lack of consent to (including
reasonable efforts to prevent) illegal activity is a valid defense to forfeiture
by a property owner.'
Fourth, H.R. 2417 eliminates the cost bond requirement.'
Currently, a property owner wanting to contest the seizure of property in
an administrative proceeding or before a federal court must give the court
a bond of the lesser of $5000 or ten percent of the value of the property
seized (but not less than $250).71 However, courts have found that, in
cases involving indigents, the cost bond requirement is unconstitutional
because it deprives such claimants of a hearing simply because they are
unable to post bond.' And, further, the cost bond requirement serves
little purpose in other cases. As David Smith writes:
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See
See
See
See
Id.

id. at 513-17.
710 Main St.,
753 F. Supp. at 123-24.
710 Main St., 744 F. Supp. at 518.
710 Main St., 753 F. Supp. at 125.

69. H.R. 2417 § 8 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) by replacing "without the
knowledge or consent of that owner," and inserting "either without the knowledge of that
owner or without the consent of that owner").
70. Id. § 6 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1614).
71. 19 C.F.R. § 164.47(b) (1994).
72. See, e.g., Wiren v. Eide, 542 F.2d 757, 763 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that "the
fifth amendment prohibits the federal government from denying the opportunity for a
hearing to persons whose property has been seized and is potentially subject to forfeiture
solely because of their inability to post a bond"). The case involved the seizure of an
automobile from an indigent owner who contended that the $250 bond requirement
violated "his rights to due process and equal protection .... " Id. (footnote omitted).
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There is no reason why a person whose property is seized by the
government should have to post a bond to defray some of the
government's litigation and storage expenses in order to have the
right to a day in court to contest the forfeiture. ....The cost
bond requirement is simply an additional financial burden on the
claimant and an added deterrent to contesting the forfeiture.'
Case closed.
Fifth, H.R. 2417 provides property owners with a reasonable time
period for challenging a forfeiture.74 Currently, if a property owner
wants to challenge a forfeiture in federal court, he or she must "file his
claim within 10 days after process has been executed."'
This time
period is woefully inadequate. Let me quote David Smith again:
Even assuming that notice is published the next day after process
is executed, the reader of the notice will have a mere nine days
to file a timely claim. Most local rules require that notice be
published for three successive weeks, on the assumption that
interested parties will not necessarily see the first published
notice. But by the time the second notice is published, more than
ten days will have elapsed from the date process was executed.
Thus anyone who misses the first published notice will be unable
to comply with the exceedingly short time limitation for filing a
claim ....76
Even though this time limit sometimes is ignored in the interests of justice,
failure to file a timely claim can result in a judgment in favor of the
government. 7 H.R. 2417 would extend this period to sixty days.78
73. Smith, supra note 35, at 5.
74. H.R. 2417 § 3 (amending Fan. R. Civ. P. C(6) (Supplemental Rules for Certain
Admiralty and Maritime Claims)).
75. PE. R. Civ. P. C(6) (Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime

Claims).
76. SMITH, supra note 44, 9.03(1), at 9-42.9 to 9-42.10.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Beechoraft Queen Airplane, 789 F.2d 627 (8th Cir.
1986). The court strictly construed the rule for filing a timely claim because the
defendant failed to (1) precede his answer with a verified claim, (2) request an extension
of time, and (3) show that he had never received actual notice, even though the court
conceded that defendant "may have believed that he had thirty days to file a response
because that is what the warrant of seizure and monition said." Id. at 630.
78. H.R. 2417 § 3 (amending FED. R. CiV. P. C(6) (Supplemental Rules for Certain
Admiralty and Maritime Claims)).
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Sixth, H.R. 2417 provides a remedy for property damage caused by
government negligence.' Currently, the federal government is exempted
from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act for damage caused by the
negligent handling or storage of property detained by law enforcement
officers.' Property awaiting forfeiture can be quickly devalued:
Seized conveyances devalue from aging, lack of care, inadequate

storage, and other factors while waiting forfeiture. They often
deteriorate-engines freeze, batteries die, seals shrink and leak
oil, boats sink, salt air and water corrode metal surfaces,

barnacles accumulate on boat hulls, and windows crack from
heat. On occasion,
vandals steal or seriously damage
8

conveyances.

1

Vacant and boarded-up real property is especially subject to deterioration,
and, sometimes, government agents utterly destroy property in futile
searches for contraband.' It is hardly a victory for a boat owner to get
back a rusted and stripped hulk of a vessel. Congressman Hyde's bill
would simply allow property owners to sue the government for
negligence.
Seventh, H.R. 2417 allows for the return of property pending final
disposition of a case.'
Currently, customs law does allow for the

release of property pending final disposition of a case upon payment of a
79. Id. § 2 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)).
80. See Kozak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848 (1984). The Court held that the U.S.
Customs Service was not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)
(1988), for damage to an art collection seized from the petitioner when he was suspected
of smuggling the collection into the country. Id. at 862. The statute exempts from
coverage "[a]ny claims arising in respect of . . . the detention of any goods or
merchandise by any officer of customs." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c).
81. U.S. COMPTROLLER GEN., U.S. GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE, BETrER CARE
AND DISPOSAL OF SEIZED CARS, BOATS, AND PLANES SHOULD SAVE MONEY AND
BENEFiT LAW ENFORCEMENT, at ii (GAO/PLRD-83-94, 1983).
82. See Florida Man's Plight Sparks Customs Service Bill, UPI, Mar. 13, 1992
(reporting the destruction of sailboat by 11 customs agents who boarded the vessel armed
with fire axes, powerdrills, and a chainsaw and, during a seven-hour search for drugs,
damaged the vessel beyond repair); Andrew Schneider & Mary P. Flaherty, Jet Seized,
Trashed, Offered Back for $66,000, PrTT. PRESS, Aug. 15, 1991, at A6 (reporting
destruction of plane seized and "torn apart" during a Drug Enforcement Administration
search).
83. H.R. 2417 § 6 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1614). For this section I am indebted to
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
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full bond.Y However, a property owner who cannot afford to secure
such a bond is out of luck, especially when the property is used in a
business, because its lack of availability for the time necessary to win a
victory in court can force an owner into bankruptcy.Y5 Often, the
property owner must settle with the government for a specific sum of
money to get the property back, despite the fact that the government has
an extremely weak case." H.R. 2417 specifies that property can be
released if continued possession by the government would cause the
claimant substantial hardship; however, conditions may be placed on
release that are appropriate to preserve the availability of the property or
its equivalent for forfeiture should the government eventually prevail.'
The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act is obviously reformist. It does
not abolish civil asset forfeiture, as the American Civil Liberties Union
and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, would like.
The reason for this is partly pragmatic. Congress is not going to get rid
of a $500 million cash cow. But it is also because Congressman Hyde
sees a role for civil forfeiture in an integrated crime-suppression strategy.
However, there is no excuse for the sloppy police work and "pillage and
plunder" mentality that is sometimes evident in forfeiture activities
today. 88 It is no small thing to take a person's property or livelihood,
and it should not be done lightly.
Although H.R. 2417 addresses several important concerns, there are
some major issues which Congressman Hyde did not take on. One is that
of adoptive forfeiture. Under this practice, state law enforcement officers
84. 19 U.S.C. § 1614 (1988).
85. 60 Minutes, supranote 19, at 8 (reporting the seizureby the Drug Enforcement
Administration of a jet chartered to transport suitcases which contained "drug money").
Although the owner of the jet denied knowledge of the contents of the suitcases and the
criminal charges against him were dropped, the jet was not returned and, subsequently,
the owner filed for bankruptcy. Id.; see also Schneider & Flaherty, supra note 82, at
A6 (reporting the same DEA seizure).
86. See Louis J. Rose & Tim Poor, Police Make Suspects Pay 'Fees', ST. LouIs
POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 28, 1991, at Al (describing seizures from people who paid local
police for the return of their property without ever being charged with a crime); see also
Schneider & Flaherty, supranote 27, at A9 (reporting that a business was seized because
there was insufficient evidence to "press a criminal case" against the owner).
87. H.R. 2417 § 6 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1614).
88. See FloridaMan's PlightSparks Customs Service Bill, supranote 82 (reporting
the search of a sailboat by the U.S. Customs Service that resulted in $50,000 worth of
damage to the vessel, which had been purchased three days earlier for $24,000); see also
David Heilbroner, The Law Goes on a Treasure Hunt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1994, §
6 (Magazine) at 70; Schneider & Flaherty, supranote 56, at A7 (reporting that in policetraining films searches included pulling out the "back seats, side door panels and roof
linings" of cars).
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seize property under state law and bring it to a federal agency for federal
forfeiture (provided that a violation of federal law has occurred and the
property is forfeitable under federal law)." The feds then return as
much as eighty-five percent of the net proceeds to the state or local agency
that initiated the case.' What would motivate local authorities to engage
in such a practice? Often, this is done in order to circumvent state laws
allocating funds generated by forfeiture to non-law enforcement uses. For
example, in Missouri, all funds forfeited under state law go to the state's
general fund. 9 State legislatures find this practice to be a slap to the
face. It is hard to argue. Allocation formulas are political decisions that
should be decided by political decisionmakers. Local law enforcement has
every right to lobby for its share of the take just as any other interest
group does-no more, no less. Why didn't Congressman Hyde take on
this abuse? It would have created insurmountable political problems, and
that is a perfectly legitimate rationale.'
A related issue is that of how the federal government should divide up
the forfeited assets it keeps. Prior to the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984, 93 federal forfeiture revenue was deposited in the general
fund of the United States Treasury; however, monies now collected by the
Department of Justice which are not used to assist state and local agencies
are deposited in the Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund.' The
money can be used to pay for forfeiture-related expenses, for rewards to
informants, to equip cars, boats and planes for law enforcementpurposes,
for prison construction costs, and for various other purposes.6 This is
clearly an invitation for abuse-the very agencies seizing property benefit
from the proceeds. As a federal judge noted, "some observers . . .
question whether we are seeing fair and effective law enforcement or an
89. 19 U.S.C. § 1616a (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see SMrrH, supra note 44, 7.02.
90. See SMITH, supranote 44, 7.02, at 7-8 to 7-9; see also Schneider & Flaherty,
supra note 27, at A9 ("In federal court, local police are guaranteed up to 80 percent of
the take-a percentage that may be more than they would receive under state law.").
91. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.623 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (providing that the proceeds
of any judicial sale or disposition of property forfeited as a result of a criminal violation,
except for property forfeited as a result of a child abuse statute violation, is to be paid
into the state general fund).
92. Cf H.R. 3347 § 17 (amending 21 U.S.C. 881(e)(3) by prohibiting transfers of
property between federal and local or state agencies that would circumvent state law
prohibiting forfeiture or limiting use or disposal of property forfeited to state or local
agencies).
93. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837.
94. Id. § 301, 98 Stat. at 2052 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1) (Supp. V 1993)).
95. See id.
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insatiable appetite for a source of increased agency revenue."'

The

Supreme Court chided former Attorney General Thornburgh for issuing

a memorandum informing United States Attorneys that "[w]e must
significantly increase production to reach our budget target.... Failure
to achieve the ... projection would expose the Department's forfeiture
program to criticism and undermine confidence in our budget projections.

Every effort must be made to increase forfeiture income ....

."I Now

this is less of a problem at the federal level than at the state level, where

the very agent who seizes a Corvette can soon be driving it around in
undercover patrols," and where small police departments can lavish
high-tech gadgets upon themselves. 9 But, even at the federal level, the
practice is troubling. Congressman Hyde did not address this issue,

maybe because no bill has a realistic chance of becoming law that will
take hundreds of millions of dollars a year away from the Justice

Department, and away from the war on drugs.
Additionally,

Congressman

Hyde

avoids

the

issue

of

disproportionality-that is, whether some forfeitures are so out of line with
the severity of the underlying

criminal behavior that they are

96. United States v. $12,390, 956 F.2d 801, 807 n.6 (8th Cir. 1992) (Beam, J.,
dissenting in part). For a discussion of the case, see generally Virginia A. Albers, Note,
Is GreaterProcessDue? United States v. Twelve Thousand, Three Hundred and Ninety
Dollars, 26 CREIOHTON L. REv. 841 (1993). The author argues that the burden of proof
should be reallocated to coincide with the government's burden in Title VII cases. Id.
at 842. In such cases, as Judge Beam noted, a probable cause showing by the
government could establish a rebuttable presumption of a right to the property by
establishing a colorable claim of title and a colorable claim that the property was
acquired legitimately. $12,390, 956 F.2d at 811-12. The government then would have
the burden of rebutting the presumption with evidence admissible at trial. Id. at 812.
Albers also argues that the government should be required to comply with the Federal
Rules of Evidence in civil forfeiture proceedings because of forfeiture's quasi-criminal
nature. Albers, supra, at 842.
97. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 502 n.2
(1993) (quoting 38 U. S. ATT'Ys' BULL. 180 (1990)).
98. See Schneider & Flaherty, supra note 27, at A8 (reporting that police may use
forfeited items merely by signing a form saying that such use will be "for law
enforcement purposes," and noting that a forfeited Corvette was made available for the
use of an assistant prosecutor); see also GRANTLAND, supranote 22, at 13-14 (asserting
that "slush funds" created under forfeiture law have "gotten out of hand" because law
enforcement agency personnel can keep items seized).
99. See Tim Poor & Louis J. Rose, Frontenac 'Hard Core' on Taking Cars, ST.
Louis POST-DIsPATcH, May 2, 1991, at IA, 4A.
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unconscionable. 1" He is mainly concerned with those with clean hands,
who present the most compelling examples of abuse. A yacht for a
joint," 1 however, is troubling. He does maintain, though that the S.S.
Minnow should have been seized because of all that unreported cash Mr.
Howell was carrying. As you may know, after the introduction of H.R.
2417, the Supreme Court decided that forfeitures can at some point

become so disproportionate that they violate the Eighth Amendment's

prohibition of excessive fines."° It will be interesting to see how lower
courts flesh out these rulings. These Supreme Court decisions have made

Congressman Hyde more amenable to considering statutory proportionality
standards.
Congressman Hyde also chose not to address the issue of facilitation.
Our drug laws subject to forfeiture all real property "which is used, or
intended to be used, in any manner or part, to . . . facilitate the
commission of a [drug crime]."" Courts have read into this provision
100. For an example of such a forfeiture, see Chapman, supra note 21, at 3

(reporting that a person's $6000 boat was seized for "illegally catching three fish"); see
also Heilbroner, supra note 88, at 72.
101. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
102. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). The Supreme Court held that

the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to civil forfeiture
proceedings and refuted the government's contention that forfeiture was not punitive but,
rather, remedial and, as such, should not be considered as constituting punishment for
purposes of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 2812. The Court stated that, although
forfeiture can be viewed as remedial, it may also constitute punishment: "'[A] civil
sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only
be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as
we have come to understand the term.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S.
435, 448 (1989)); see also Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993). After
being convicted of 17 counts of obscenity and three counts of violating RICO, Alexander,
the owner of more than a dozen stores and theaters dealing in sexually explicit material,
was sentenced to six years in prison, fined $100,000, and ordered to pay the costs of
prosecution, incarceration and supervised release. Id. at 2769-70. In addition,
Alexander was forced to forfeit his businesses and almost $9 million. Id. at 2770. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, without considering whether such
a forfeiture was disproportionate or "excessive," held that it did not violate the Eighth
Amendment because proportionality review was not required "'of any sentence less than
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.'" Id. (quoting Alexander v.
Thomburgh, 943 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1991)). The Supreme Court found that, in making
such a determination, the Eighth Circuit had erroneously included the "excessive fines"
component of the Eighth Amendment with that of "cruel and unusual punishment," when
it should have analyzed the forfeiture at issue as an excessive fine becauseit was "clearly
a form of monetary punishment no different, for Eighth Amendment purposes, from a
traditional 'fine.'" Id. at 2775-76.
103. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1988) (emphasis added).
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a requirement that there be a "substantial connection between the property
and the underlying illegal transaction" to avoid forfeitures where the
property "has only an incidental or fortuitous connection to criminal
activity."'
However, the connection can often be tenuous. For
example, in one case a house was found to have been used to facilitate
drug sales because it was found to be the drop-off spot as well as the base
from which its owner conducted his negotiations." Congressman Hyde
is content with the "substantial connection" test, as long as it is applied

judiciously.
Finally, the most thoroughgoing reform of all was rejected-doing
away completely with civil asset forfeiture, or requiring that the
government prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. I believe I have

mentioned the reasons why."°

As I have illustrated, Congressman Hyde's bill has "dropped the ball"

in some respects. But then, there is Congressman John Conyers, who was
one of the first in Congress to sound the alarm over forfeiture abuses,

especially as to how they impacted on minorities. ") On October 22,
08

1993, he introduced House Bill 3347, the Asset Forfeiture Justice Act.
This bill goes far beyond Congressman Hyde's legislation, and essentially
would shut down the federal government's civil forfeiture program.
While I suspect that no one, least of all Representative Conyers, expects
any substantial part of his legislation to be enacted into law, it provides a
104. United States v. Certain Lots in Va. Beach, 657 F. Supp. 1062, 1065 (E.D.
Va. 1987).
105. See United States v. 124 E. N. Ave., 651 F. Supp. 1350, 1353-54 (N.D. Ill.
1987). The court differentiated the isolated use of a telephone at a home to discuss a
narcotics sale from the facts in the present case in which "the phone at the defendant
property was used regularly to coordinate the sale and delivery of cocaine" and the
"property was to be the situs of a delivery of five kilograms of cocaine." Id. Under the
latter facts, "a sufficient nexus between the alleged illegal activity and the defendant
property is asserted [because] probable cause existed to believe the defendant property
was being used or intended to be used to facilitate the violation of federal narcotics
laws." Id. at 1354.
106. See supratext accompanying notes 45-47.
107. While Chairman of the House Committee on Government Operations'
Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, Representative Conyers held a
number of hearings on asset forfeiture. See Review of FederalAssetForfeitureProgram:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Legislationand NationalSecurity of the House Comm.
on Government Operations, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Department of Justice Asset
ForfeitureProgram:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Legislationand NationalSecurity
of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
108. H.R. 3347, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill has also been introduced
as Title X of the Congressional Black Caucus's omnibus crime bill. See H.R. 3315,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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good gauge of Congress' level of disgust with forfeiture abuses.
Moreover, it reminds us that reform-and there will be reform-can be

carried out by those essentially friendly to the underlying program, as well
as by those hostile to it.
Right off the bat, H.R. 3347 switches the burden of proof in civil

forfeiture proceedings to the government and imposes upon it a standard
of clear and convincing evidence." °

So far, so good.

That's all

Congressman Hyde did. But, H.R. 3347 also requires that forfeiture must
be preceded by a "conviction of the owner of such property for the crime

upon which the forfeiture is based.""'

There is a name for this:

criminal forfeiture. But this is much more rarely used, much less
effective and, thus, a much too drastic step."'
H.R. 3347 further requires a preliminary hearing prior to most

seizures absent exigent circumstances.

As you may know, the

Supreme Court recently ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment mandates a preliminary hearing before the seizure of real
property. 1 Congressman Hyde believes that, outside of real property,

which, except in California, rarely threatens to pick up and move, such
a requirement would prove too burdensome on law enforcement. Try to
imagine a case where there is no risk that property or assets would
disappear once the owner is tipped off to an imminent seizure.
109. H.R. 3347 § 4 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1615).
110. Id. § 2 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1604).
111. Id. § 9 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1082(c)). A reinforcingprovision, this section
requires that some action be taken against the property owner in personam. Id.
Presumably, a criminal indictment would be enough.
112. Id. § 5 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 981(b); 19 U.S.C. §§ 1595(a)(1), 1603(a); 21
U.S.C. § 881(b)). A hearing is not necessary with seizures "incident to an arrest or a
search under a search warrant" when (1) "the property subject to seizure has been the
subject of a prior judgment in favor of the United States"; (2) "there is probable cause
to believe that the property is directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety"; or
(3) "there is probable cause to believe that the delay occasioned by the need to secure
an order will frustrate the seizure." Id.
113. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S.Ct. 492, 505
(1993). The Court relied on the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976), which requires consideration of the private interest at stake, the risk
of erroneous decisions through the procedures used, and the government's interest. Good,
114 S. Ct. at 501. Under this analysis, the Court characterized the government's interest
as "the specific interest in seizing real property before the forfeiture hearing. The
question in the civil forfeiture context is whether ex parte seizure is justified by a
pressing need for prompt action." Id. at 502. The Court found no such need. See id.
For a general discussion of the use of the Mathews balancing test, see Lassiter v.
Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981).
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As with H.R. 2417, the Conyers bill eliminates the cost bond
115
requirement,114 requires the appointment of counsel for indigents,
1
6
extends the filing deadline to sixty days, and allows for actions to be
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 7 Also, analogous to
Congressman Hyde's provision allowing property to be released pending

the final disposition of a case, H.R. 3347 provides that, before seizure,
the government must show a court that "the need to preserve the
availability of the property [through seizure] outweighs the hardship to any
party of interest."118
H.R. 3347 also provides that a property owner has a right to a jury
trial in civil forfeiture cases. 9 This is already a Seventh Amendment
rightl for owners of property seized on land."' For "seizure made
on waters navigable by vessels of ten tons burthen and upwards, the court
sits as a Court of Admiralty," and no jury trial is required."
Now,
there is nothing wrong with extending this right over water, but far be it
114. H.R. 3347 § 6 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1608).
115. Id.

116. Id. § 10 (amending FED. R. Civ. P. C(6) (Supplemental Rules for Certain
Admiralty and Maritime Claims)).
117. Id. §§ 19, 23 (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2680(c), 2645). Compensation would
not require negligence on the part of government employees. Id. § 19.
118. Id. § 5 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 981(b); 19 U.S.C. § 1603(a); 21 U.S.C. §
881(b)).
119. Id. § 7 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1610).
120. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of a trial by jury shall be preserved.
121. See United States v. 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453, 456 (7th Cir.
1980) (holding that the owner of an automobile allegedly used in connection with the
transport of narcotics was wrongly denied a jury trial in a forfeiture proceeding). The
district court in 1976 Mercedes Benz discussed at some length the Seventh Amendment's
preservation of the right to a jury trial in civil suits at common law, and distinguished
equity cases from admiralty cases, in which there is no right to a jury trial. See id. The
Seventh Circuit quoted C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943): "'[Il]n cases
of forfeiture of articles seized on land for violation of federal statutes, the district courts
proceed as courts of common law according to the course of the Exchequer on
informations in rem with trial byjury.'" 1976 Mercedes Benz, 618 F.2d at 463 (quoting
Hendry, 318 U.S. at 153). Because the car was seized on land, the forfeiture case would
proceed as at common law; therefore, the defendant was entitled to a jury trial. Id. at
468.
122. The Sarah, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 391,394 (1823) ("In cases of seizure, on land,
the court sits as a court of common law [and] the trial must be by jury[, however, un
cases of admiralty .... it has been settled... that the trial is to be by the court.").
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for a Republican to come out in defense of yacht owners. In any event,
for one reason or another, defense counsel do not make use of this
valuable tool where they already have it."
H.R. 3347 further provides that no "property which has been paid or
pledged as bona fide attorneys' fees be forfeited .. . ."I' The Supreme

Court, however, has ruled that the Sixth Amendment l does not exempt
from criminal forfeiture assets intended to be used to pay for counsel in
a criminal prosecution."
Why should we take this step with civil
forfeitures? One should not have the right to use ill-gotten gains to
procure the most costly lawyers around.
H.R. 3347 also establishes a statutory proportionality standard: "the
value of the property forfeited . . . may not exceed the pecuniary gain
derived from the offense . . . . "
This seems much more liberal than
any constitutional standard that could possibly come down following the
Supreme Court's decisions in Austin v. United States" and Alexander
v. United States."' If a dealer sells a lethal dose of drugs with a street

value of twenty-five dollars, only the twenty-five dollars can be

seized. ° This diminishes any real deterrent effect to the vanishing
point. For purposes of forfeiture, what would be the value of a bald eagle
killed in violation of United States law, especially since it is illegal to stuff
and sell it?"'
123.
124.
125.
the right

SMITH, supra note 44, 11.01.
H.R. 3347 § 8 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2)).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
126. See Caplin & Drysdalev. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 630 (1989). The Court
stated:
It is our view that there is a strong governmental interest in obtaining full
recovery of all forfeitable assets, an interest that overrides any Sixth
Amendment interest in permitting criminals to use assets adjudged forfeitable
to pay for their defense. Otherwise, there would be an interference with a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights whenever the Government freezes or takes
some property in a defendant's possession before, during or after a criminal
trial.
Id. at 631.
127. H.R. 3347 § 11 (amending 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(a), 881(a)).
128. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993); see also supra note 103.
129. 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993); see also supra note 103.
130. H.R. 3347 § 11 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) by inserting "[e]xcept that the
value of the property forfeited under this section may not exceed the pecuniary gain
derived from the offense or the pecuniary loss caused by the offense").
131. See 16 U.S.C. § 668b (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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Congressman Conyers' bill eliminates the manifestly unfair relationback doctrine, which strips away the innocent owner defense by conferring
title of property to the government at the time of the underlying criminal
activity."
Under this theory, if a person innocently buys or receives
tainted property, the government can claim that the buyer never was an
owner because defective title was passed."
This "would result in the
forfeiture of property innocently acquired by persons who had been paid
with illegal proceeds for providing goods or services to drug traffickers
.... "' This provision is fine, except that the Supreme Court ruled last
February that the government cannot claim ownership under the relationback theory for any time period before forfeiture actually takes place. 3
Yet another issue that only Congressman Conyers confronts is the
nexus problem, which H.R. 3347 attempts to solve by limiting real
property subject to seizure under the Controlled Substances Act to that
"used primarily to commit a violation of [the Act] punishable by more
than 1 year's imprisonment ....."11 The term "primarily" presumably
means just that: a house would have to be primarily used as a drug drop
rather than for habitation to be forfeitable. This goes a bit too far.
Congressman Conyers tackles adoptive forfeiture by requiring that all
assets transferred to state and local law enforcement agencies be sent
directly to state treasuries for disposition according to state law, 37 and
by prohibiting funds from being "transferred to circumvent any
requirement of State law that prohibits forfeiture or limits use or disposal
of property ...."13 Good for him.
Additionally, H.R. 3347 tackles the "disposition of funds"
problem-not by sending all assets to the federal treasury-but by
requiring that at least half of the amounts disbursed be used for drug
132. H.R. 3347 § 12 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(f, 1963(c); 21 U.S.C. §§
853(c), 881(h)).
133. See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S.Ct. 1126 (1993) (involving
a home allegedly bought with proceeds of illegal drug trafficking whose owner claimed
lack of knowledge of any wrongdoing as a defense).
134. Id. at 1135 (footnote omitted).
135. See id. at 1137 ("The Government cannot profit from the common-law doctrine
of relation back until it has obtained a judgment of forfeiture. And it cannot profit from
the statutory version of that doctrine in [21 U.S.C.] § 881(h) until respondent has had
the chance to invoke and offer evidence to support the innocent owner defense under §
881(a)(6).").
136. H.R. 3347 § 13 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)).
137. Id. § 14 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 981(e)(2); 19 U.S.C. § 1616(e)(1)(B)(ii); 21
U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A)).
138. Id. § 17 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(3); 31 U.S.C. § 9703(b)(4)).
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education, prevention, and treatment programs. 139 Congressman Hyde
certainly believes that law enforcement comes first. Successful treatment
for those not wholly committed to recovery is a blue moon proposition.
Furthermore, H.R. 3347 prohibits paying an informant more than
$250,000 a year."
This provision is apparently aimed at airport
personnel who report suspicious characters and typically keep ten percent
of any resulting take. 41 This is a useful practice and Congressman
Hyde sees no need to curtail it. In fact, airlines could possibly give out
frequent-flier miles to passengers who provide good tips. However, he is
concerned about the wide use of criminals as informants.
H.R. 3347 also requires that records be kept concerning property
transferred, especially "the circumstances of the investigation and seizure

of the forfeiture, including the race, national origin, gender, and age of
those with an interest in the property prior to seizure."142

In addition, H.R. 3347 requires that forfeiture proceedings be
instituted within one year after seizure, and that interest be paid on seized

cash or negotiable instruments that are eventually returned."4

Good

ideas, except we might want to go further. There is already a provision
that requires the government to file its complaint for forfeiture within sixty
days after a claim and cost bond have been filed challenging the seizure
of a conveyance under the anti-drug statute. 1 " Why not extend this
provision to all forfeiture proceedings?
H.R. 3347 also provides that "[n]o action to forfeit property shall be
brought more than 1 year from the date of the offense that is the basis for
139. Id. § 15 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)).
140. Id. § 16 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1963(g)(3); 19 U.S.C. § 1619(c); 21 U.s.C.
§ 853(i)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(2); 31 U.S.C. § 9703(b)).
141. See Andrew Schneider & Mary P. Flaherty, Crime Pays Bigfor Informants in
Forfeitures, Prrr. PRESS, Aug. 14, 1991, at Al (reporting that in 1990, the U.S.
Department of Justice paid $24 million to informants).
142. H.R. 3347 § 18 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1616a(e)).
143. Id. § 19 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2465).
144. The statute provides:
Not later than 60 days after a claim and cost bond have been filed under
section 1608 of title 19 regarding a conveyance seized for a drug-related
offense, the Attorney General shall file a complaint for forfeiture in the
appropriate district court, except that the court may extend the period for filing
for good cause shown or an agreement of the parties. If the Attorney General
does not file a complaint as specified in the preceding sentence, the court shall
order the return of the conveyance to the owner and the forfeiture may not
take place.
21 U.S.C. § 888(c) (Supp. V 1993).
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Current customs law sets out a statute of
."'
the forfeiture . .
limitations such that "[n]o suit or action to recover any pecuniary penalty
or forfeiture of property... shall be instituted unless such suit or action
is commenced within five years after the time when the alleged offense
Congressman Hyde also has no problem with
was discovered." 1'
cutting the time period down to a year, but one year from the discovery
of the offense, not one year from the time of the offense. Otherwise, a
loophole is created for those criminals crafty enough to conceal their
activities.
Finally, H.R. 3347 requires that administrative and contracting
expenses not exceed ten percent of the amount paid from the Department
of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund,147 and that the Attorney General file
a yearly report to Congress of these expenses." Furthermore, the bill
requires that the Attorney General offer "low value real property" for sale
"for nominal consideration to tax-exempt organizations that provide direct
services furthering community-based crime control, housing, or education
efforts" in the area.149 Fine.

Well, I imagine the Justice and Treasury departments would be
happier with Congressman Hyde's bill than with Congressman Conyers'.
Congressman Hyde would leave civil forfeiture an effective and lucrative
program while again allowing us in government to look ourselves in the
mirror.

145. H.R. 3347 § 7 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1610).
146. 19 U.S.C. § 1621 (Supp. V 1993). The customs law contains additional time
requirements. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988) (requiring the Attorney General
"forthwith to cause the proper proceedings to be commenced" when it is probable that
a forfeiture has been incurred). However, the Supreme Court has ruled that because
Congress failed "to specify a consequence for noncompliance with the timing
requirements of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1604... the responsible officials administering the
Act [inpliedly] have discretion to determine what disciplinary measures are appropriate
Mhe courts should not dismiss a forfeiture action for noncompliance." United
....
States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 506-07 (1993).
147. H.R. 3347 § 20 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)).
148. Id. § 21 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(6)).
149. Id. § 22 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)).

